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Indian federalism at the crossroads: Limits of the territorial management of ethnic conflict

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ABSTRACT

This article critically examines territorial strategies adopted by the Indian state to accommodate territorially concentrated minority groups in two very recent cases: the formation of Telangana (2014) and the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) (2003). We situate both cases within the broader context of linguistic state reorganization in India since the 1950s. We argue that while the formation of states on the basis of linguistic principle was necessary given the long history of demand for linguistic states in India, it is, as Telangana and BTC clearly bear out, not sufficient to accommodate minorities. This is especially the case when, inter alia, language is: (1) appropriated by the dominant group within a state (or states) as a vehicle to perpetuate political majoritarianism, (2) supplemented by weak power-sharing arrangement, and (3) occasioned by longstanding popular perceptions of historical injustices and relative deprivation.

Introduction

In this article, we critically examine territorial strategies adopted by the Indian state to accommodate territorially concentrated minority groups in two very recent cases: the formation of Telangana out of the state of Andhra Pradesh in 2014 and the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) in the state of Assam in 2003. Both cases are used to revisit the recasting of India's internal political borders on the basis of language. We argue that while the linguistic reorganization of the Indian states responded to long-standing demands for linguistic states in India, it is, as Telangana and BTC clearly bear out, not sufficient to accommodate minorities especially when language is appropriated by the dominant group within a state(s) as a vehicle to perpetuate political majoritarianism. Against this backdrop, we contend that the capacity for language to hold people together within a single state is thin when (i) political majoritarianism exposes internal variations of language, which become handy for minority groups to contest presumed linguistic and cultural unity and embark upon different political projects of their own; (ii)

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there is a weak power-sharing arrangement; and (iii) longstanding popular perception of historical injustices and relative deprivation. In other words, without envisioning adequate rights and robust power-sharing arrangements to safeguard local and/or territorially/non-territorially based minorities or without sufficient provision to give heed to the voice of said groups in the governance of the newly empowered state or territory (through shared rule), we argue that self-rule at the state level is awfully inadequate to maintain peaceful inter-community relations. As the case materials on the BTC illustrate, self-rule can unleash bloody ethnic conflicts at the sub-state level when territorial arrangements transform an ethnic minority into a sub-state political majority that dominates many minorities and even engages in ethnic cleansing to secure its domination.

A brief explanation to examine two seemingly disparate cases merits a review. Unlike Telangana which had a weak power-sharing arrangement within the erstwhile united state of Andhra Pradesh (AP) in terms of securing two out of the five key cabinet portfolios of Home, Finance, Revenue, Planning and Development, and Commerce and Industry, and having separate, yet limited sub-state autonomy arrangement under Regional Committee (1956–74), the Bodos did not enjoy a state-wide power-sharing arrangement in Assam. That the Bodos were left out of the territorial autonomy arrangements envisioned for their hill tribal counterparts in the Northeast under the Sixth Schedule of India's Constitution was significant in that the Bodos were subsumed within the Assamese identity as a result.[1] The failure to envision a robust power-sharing arrangement has persisted with the creation of the BTC in 2003 when 30 out of the 46 seats in the BTC were exclusively reserved for the tribals (read here as Bodos), five for non-tribals, five were opened to all communities, and six seats were to be filled by the governor of Assam as nominated seats.

There are, however, a set of similarities which tie the two cases together. First, their common historical experience under linguistic states wherein economically and politically dominant ethnolinguistic groups—coastal Andhra Telugus in the case of Telangana and Assamese in the case of Bodos—are seen to perpetuate political majoritarianism. Second, both the Telangana people and Bodos contested the presumed linguistic and cultural unity in their respective states and embarked upon different political projects of their own. For Telangana, the Nizam's[2] rule for over two centuries (eighteenth to nineteenth century) generated a distinctive influence which the Urdu language and Persian culture (in terms of food, dress, way of life, and so on) had on Telugu spoken in the region. This provided the ethno-historical source to reclaim their distinctive identity, language and culture against their counterparts from coastal Andhra and Rayalseema, the territories of which were acquired by the British in the latter half of the 18th century and thus fell under the spell of English education and British colonial modernity.[3] Similarly, the Bodos claim that they are autochthonous to Assam and consider the Assamese as outsiders who came to Assam as invaders, spoke different language and professed different culture. In juxtaposition to the Bengali script used in Assamese language,

the Bodos deliberately use Bodo language in the Devanagiri script to assert their distinctive identity, language, and culture.[4]

What emerges very clearly from both the Telangana and Bodo case is that language provides a thin basis to hold people together in a state(s) when dissensual communities embark on different political projects. We argue that language can indeed be a precarious basis for holding people together within a state(s) when there is at best a weak power-sharing arrangement. Third, both the Telangana and the Bodo regions had witnessed longstanding struggles against domination of the political majority group, which considerably constrained their access to economic and political power. We shall illustrate that the longstanding grievances of historical injustice and relative deprivation that the two regions experienced became glaringly apparent with the changed political economy and political opportunity structure opened up by coalition politics. By choosing the BTC as one of our case studies we can "scale down" our understanding of the aforementioned complex dynamics which standard discourses on the politics of states' reorganization of India generally fail to throw light upon as they are generally limited to state-level dynamics.[5] BTC unravels the limits and problems of a territorial autonomy design at the sub-state level when it leverages a minority group as a political majority over many minorities.

For the two case studies, we rely on primary data generated by field work in the regions collected through elite interviews with the leaders of ethnic political parties, rebels, civil servants and political officials. We also study proceedings of parliament, reports of the Ministry of Home Affairs (New Delhi) and consider statistics on violence or other relevant official statistics, ethnic peace accords, and reports of the Government of India on state reorganization and the minority languages. In both cases, appropriate ethnographic data have been used in order to provide the relevant social and cultural backdrop of the issues. These data when assessed in relation to the existing knowledge on the subject, give us the opportunity to provide a more objective understanding and explanation of the issues.

In the section that follows we contextualize the politics of state reorganization and examine the limits of "linguistic federalism" as a dominant method of territorial accommodation of minorities in India. Subsequently, we examine the cases of Telangana and BTC in two separate sections and finally conclude.

Contextualizing the reorganization of Indian states

Indian federalism has been recognized among the world's federations for its relative success in the management of ethnicity mostly through territorial accommodation. Given its immense ethnic diversity, this is remarkable for a region not particularly known for durable political order and stability. For an outsider and federal purist, Indian federation building may seem bizarre

because it has defied all the conventional means of doing so. India still remains a federation in the making. Unlike the United States, Swiss, and other classical federations, in the Indian case there was no "federal compact" among the independent states; hence, there was no question of a "defensive alliance."[6] The accommodation of diversity in favor of political order and unity was not the main objective of the formation of classical federations. In the Indian case, that was the most pressing need of the hour. With Pakistan separated on the basis of religion (Islam) in 1947, religion-based claims for territories were ruled out. Since India's ethnic diversity was deeply rooted in territories, accommodation of diversity demanded serious attention to territorial issues. It is not true of course that India's manifold ethnic diversity neatly corresponds to territorial boundaries.

Territorial disaggregation, informed by the linguistic principle, was the dominant method of federation building in India. Yet it was no panacea given the presence of very large ethnolinguistic minorities in each newly created subnational unit which did not enjoy adequate protection under the constitution. As our case study and other materials below suggest, neither the so-called "linguistic federalism" in India nor federation building by accommodating various non-linguistic factors has been the most effective institutional methods of, and long term solutions to, accommodating *ethnic differences*. In most cases, some dominant ethnic groups, not always in a numerical majority, have reaped the benefits of statehood to the exclusion and deprivation of the ethnic others.

India's federal units are not explicitly designed as ethnic homelands though the manner in which such units were created along some ethnic markers, most notably language, seem to make them so in reality. The Constitution of India does not recognize nationhood, thus assuming that India as a territorial unity constitutes the nation. But nationality claims dot the country's federal space in reality. Like many other postcolonial countries, federalism was adopted as a device for nation building in India with relative success.

Two critical issues here merit immediate attention. First, nation building was to take place in complex cultural, linguistic and regional diversity. Second, nationness adopted was rather an abstract notion of unity tailored to hold together deep diversity. In fact, "unity in diversity" was harped on time and again by Jawaharlal Nehru, the county's top nationalist leader and first Prime Minister from 1947 until his death in 1964. Political leaders did not seek to build the Indian nation through multinational federalism. While there was a broad consensus since 1956 that some form of territorial accommodation was imperative to accommodate linguistic differences, the accommodation of territorial minorities through linguistic federalism or other forms of territorial management have their own limits given that many ethnolinguistic minorities continue to exist within existing states of India's federation.

The conventional political wisdom on federation building in India suggests that the recurrent state reorganization to "right-size" the political map of India has

been key to India's relative political order and stability. A brief but critical analytic narrative of state formation in India since 1956 in different phases show the differential approaches of the central as well as state leadership in privileging varying factors like ethnolinguistic identity (not necessarily of a majority), religion-cum-ethnic identity (in the case of the Punjab), development (Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand), regional identity (Telangana) and so on. Although these were purportedly used to reorganize states overtime, the actually existing politics of state reorganization in India was informed by political opportunism, coalitional compulsions and unprincipled bargaining among the stakeholders. The more recent deviation from the principle of language as a basis of state reorganization to nearly *any* identity marker is a very poor adaptation of Indian federalism which paves the way for political opportunism and short-sighted policy choices which are self-defeating.

In fact, the Indian state adopted the principle of "linguistic federalism" to reorganize its states from 1956 in response to the longstanding demand for linguistic states and as a fulfillment of a nationalist pledge of the Congress party since 1920.[7] Long before India's reorganization of states in 1956, the Congress party was reorganized along ethnofederal lines in 1917: the Maharashtra and Gujarat Provincial Committees were formed in 1917 inside the party in order to facilitate better political communication.[8] By 1918, Congress had formed 21 Provincial Congress Committees centered around language.

Confronted with communal riots, chaos and uncertainty which accompanied the partition of India into Pakistan and India in 1947, the founding fathers of the Constitution of India, settled for a strong centralized federation, officially called a "Union of States." The pledge made before independence for a federal India structured around linguistic units disappeared from view as a consequence. Nehru himself was quite hesitant about the formation of linguistic states.[9] Yet, the pressures from various provincial units of the Congress party itself were mounting even before India's Constituent Assembly (1946–49) held its first meeting in 1946 in which Pattabhi Sitaramayya, a leading Congressman from the Telugu region of the then Madras province, played a leading role in mobilizing support by holding a conference in Delhi.[10] The separate statehood demand for the Telugus like others were not considered by the Congress central leadership as immediate. Despite his initial reluctance, Nehru had to give in when Potti Sriramulu, a Gandhian, fasted unto death in Madras on December 15, 1952 for the cause of a separate state of Andhra to be carved out of the Madras Presidency. Nehru simultaneously announced the formation of Andhra and the States Reorganization Commission (SRC) in Parliament in 1953.

The SRC Report, 1955[11] underscored the imperative to put in place a *balanced approach* that would be sensitive not only to linguistic demands but also to other factors such as administrative convenience and economic viability. It sought to create sub-national units *as linguistically homogeneous as possible* (emphasis added) by cutting territory from one state and pasting it to

another. By drawing state boundaries along language borders (with Hindi as the major exception, given that not all Hindi-speaking majority states were united in one state),[12] language was the most powerful factor in "states' reorganization" from the 1950s to the late 1960s. Subsequent reorganizations deviated from the linguistic principle in order to accommodate many non-linguistic factors such as regional, sub-regional identity and tribal affiliations.

In the first major reorganization of states in India in 1956 as many as 14 "linguistic states" were created but within each of them large minorities remained. In Bombay, first created in 1956, for example, the combined linguistic minority population was 49 percent.[13] Bombay was reorganized again in 1960 which gave birth to the states of Gujarat and Maharashtra. In 2014, Maharashtra[14] still only has 68.79 percent Marathi speakers followed by 11.03 percent Hindi speakers, 7.12 Urdu speakers, and 2.3 percent Gujarati speakers. By 1966 the first round of states reorganization could be said to be over. In most cases except Punjab, the Congress central leadership fell victim to the pressure tactics of its provincial units. In the case of Punjab, a stronghold of the Sikh jat dominated Akali Dal, not Nehru but the successor Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri conceded a Sikh state on the basis of religion and language.[15] Oddly enough, the state of Nagaland in India's Northeast was conceded in 1963, unwillingly, by Nehru, after India's humiliation to the Chinese in 1962. Neither language nor tribal ethnicity played a role in its creation.

The next major reorganization of territory of India took place in what is known as India's Northeast in 1972 following the North East Areas (Reorganization) Act in 1971. Except Manipur and Tripura which were erstwhile princely kingdoms and acceded to the Indian Union in 1949, the reorganization of the Northeast was the outcome of protracted negotiations. This was not surprising given that the Naga and Mizo rebels posed the most serious challenge to India's democratic and state consolidation. Although Meghalaya was formed in 1971 in response to a largely peaceful and democratic movement, the states of Nagaland and Mizoram were created after signing accords respectively in 1963 and 1986, which were the culmination of violent struggles and protracted negotiations.[16] Arunachal Pradesh was created in 1986 as a sort of gift from the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi despite the fact that no vigorous statehood movement had ever been launched.[17] Because most of these states were established on the basis of tribal ethnicity and without taking their economic viability into account, the reorganization of Northeastern states flouted the accepted principle that no state would be formed unless they are economically viable.

The consequences of states reorganization in the Northeast are not slight. Apart from creating states which are perpetually dependent on the Center's largesse, state reorganization has not led to homogenous tribal homelands. In Nagaland, for example, there are 23 linguistic Naga sub-tribes of which Ao is the largest (10.94 percent). In Meghalaya, one dominant tribe, the Khasis (47.05 percent), dominated the state and the Garos (31.41 percent in 2011), the second largest tribe in the state, are engaged in struggles for the formation of Garoland out of Meghalaya.[18]

The ethnic peace accords signed between the rebels, state government and the Central government before territorial authority is conceded are testaments to the saliency of political expediency, anachronism and the blackmail strategy of tribal ethnic rebels acting from behind.[19] Except in Mizoram where the Mizos make up 73.21 percent of the population followed by the Bengalis (9.05 percent, (2011) other North Eastern states contain numerous minority groups which have resented one group having harnessed all benefits of statehood.

In 2000 three new states were created by the method of bifurcation: Chhattisgarh from Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand from Bihar, and Uttarakhand from Uttar Pradesh.[20] These states were formed when the BJP-NDA (1) was in power on the basis of no particular principle. Like their parent states, these states are also Hindi speaking. The story of their creation is testimony to the significance of intra-elite conflicts within the parent states and the political opportunism of the BJP to gain a stronger foothold in these states following their formation.[21] In Jharkhand, originally meant to be a state for the tribals, the tribals were left in a small minority (less than 28 percent), effectively creating a second state for the Biharis! In Jharkhand, 57.56 percent speak Hindi, whereas tribal languages are spoken by about 19 percent. This is again an illustration of how a new state benefits not the minority but a dominant political majority.

The problem in all the episodes of state reorganization is that linguistically more homogenous states have also strengthened the political principle of majoritarianism in their structures of government and administration. These often worked to undermine the constitutional safeguards for minority protection. For instance, the 50th Report of the Commissioner of Linguistic Minorities[22] was dismayed at the fact that eight states even did not bother to reply to the questionnaire sent to them for eliciting information and that most states implemented the constitutional safeguards only "in parts." The Report stated:

> …there is an urgent and pressing need to evolve and institute an effective mechanism to monitor and ensure the implementation of the Constitutional and other Safeguards for the linguistic minorities at the State and District level.[23]

That is a shorthand admission of the pretty dismal picture so that even after more than five decades since 1950 an official report does have to reiterate the "urgent and pressing need" to protect and safeguard the minority languages. Therefore, the non-territorial institutional arrangements for accommodation of ethnic identity (language rights, the rights to culture, religion and so on) are a poor counterbalance for the majority in control of the state administration and government. The recommendations of the Minority Linguistic Commission could hardly conceal its anguish about the overall situation. As we will see, we find evidence of similar majoritarian logics at work in the context of two contemporary processes of territorial rescaling: Telangana and Bodoland which are the two case studies of our analysis.

Case study 1

Telangana: From a region to a state

After six decades of intermittent struggle the state of Telangana was formed on 2 June 2014 as the twenty-ninth state of India by carving ten out of the twenty-three districts of undivided Andhra Pradesh (AP). Although the States Reorganization Commission (SRC), appointed by the Center on December 22, 1953, conditionally recommended a separate Telangana state on considerations of, among others, its economic backwardness and differential political and historical experience under the Nizam rule, it narrowly missed the statehood bus in the first round of Indian states reorganization in 1956. The demand for a separate Telangana state gained momentum early in 1954 when two influential Congress leaders, K.V. Ranga Reddy and M. Chenna Reddy lent their support. Yet, it soon became muted by the winter of 1955 when proponents of Vishalandhra (greater Andhra) outvoted this in the Hyderabad Assembly.[24] This brought into relief the SRC's recommendation that Telangana be merged with Coastal Andhra and Rayalseema after 1961 *only* if two-third members of the residual Hyderabad State Assembly would resolve to do so.[25] The merger was expedited after the Chief Ministers (CM) of Hyderabad and Andhra agreed to form a united Andhra Pradesh in 1955, which was officially endorsed by eight political leaders from across the regions on February 20, 1956 in what is famously known as the *Gentlemen's Agreement*.

This Agreement envisioned a power-sharing arrangement to accommodate distinctive political aspirations of the Telangana region. The Agreement provided for, inter alia, a 20 member regional council for Telangana. A distribution of cabinet portfolios was put forward wherein the proportion of members for Andhra and Telangana was respectively fixed at 60 percent and 40 percent. Moreover, if the post of CM was allocated to a person from Andhra including Rayalseema, the Deputy CM would be given to Telangana. Two key cabinet portfolios chosen from the Home, Finance, Revenue, Planning and Development, and Commerce and Industry portfolios would be assigned to ministers from Telangana.[26] The Gentlemen's Agreement also provided that surplus in income of Telangana after deducting its proportional share in the state's expenditure on central and general administration would be earmarked for Telangana's development expenditure. Apart from these, favorable and protective service conditions were, *inter alia*, provided by laying down 12 years of domiciliary requirements for employment in government services in Telangana.[27]

However, the Gentlemen's Agreement provided an expansive, yet weak power sharing framework and it was not observed in practice. The Srikrishna Committee, a consultative committee appointed by the Government of India to study the political state of play in Andhra Pradesh after sustained and vigorous

protest from the movement for Telangana, found that Telangana only held the post of Deputy CM four times in the period between 1956 and 2010, totaling 7.8 years. Although this was slightly better than Rayalseema and Andhra's shares in the same period (three times or 5.7 years versus once and 2.2. years respectively), Telangana fared worse in holding the post of Chief Minister (six times or 10.6 years compared with nine times or 23.9 years and 10 times or 18.11 years for Rayalseema and Andhra respectively).[28] Again, although Telangana had relatively stronger shares in the Home and Revenue portfolios (it occupied these portfolios 13 times each for a total of 31 and 23 years respectively), it was only given the Finance portfolio five times for a total of 9.5 years. In comparison Rayalseema was never given the Finance portfolio whereas Andhra occupied the post 15 times for a period of 26.4 years. Interestingly, while Rayalseema received Home and Revenue two and three times respectively for a period of 1.4 and 4.9 years, Andhra captured the Home portfolio eight times (for a total of 10.8 years) and Revenue 11 times (covering 20.9 years).[29]

Attempts to make the Regional Committee (RC)[30] work for the Telangana since 1958 only further exposed its weakness as a devolutionary body. Although the RC was mandated to "deal with and decide matters. . .relating to planning and development, irrigation and other projects, industrial development within the general plan and recruitment to services as far as they relate to Telangana area" it lacked the requisite power and finance.[31] In a detailed study of the working of the first three RCs (1958–59 to 1973), K.V. Narayana Rao found that in many cases resolutions or proposals submitted to it were found by the state to be outside and beyond the RC's competence. Prominent among these are, inter alia, resolutions on the Pochampad Project in 1959 and temporary appointments to services requiring 15 years of domicily. The Committee also disagreed with the state in the calculation of the Telangana surplus which was to be spent on infrastructural development in Telangana. This matter came to a head in 1968 when J. Chokka Rao, the then Chairman of the RC, contended that the ₹300 million (INR) annual surplus generated by Telangana was not duly spent for the allocated purpose.[32] The controversy led to the appointment of two Commissions in 1969, each headed by Kumar Lalit and Justice Vashishtha Bhargava. Although the Lalit and Bhargava Commissions concluded differential Telangana surplus amounts at ₹223.1 million and ₹283.4 million respectively, they unanimously concurred that a considerable annual surplus generated by Telangana had not been spent on its development.[33]

Previous studies have shown that the Telangana movement stemmed from uneven modernization, breakdown of patrimonialism, changing political economy, and factional politics, among others.[34] Unlike coastal Andhra and the Rayalseema region which saw the introduction of modern education, constitutional democracy and infrastructure early on under the British rule, Telangana inherited a feudal landownership system stemming from the Nizam's militaristic rule. The Nizam extracted rent and revenues from

Telangana people through an elaborate system of intermediaries, namely, Deshmukhs and Doras who were drawn from the upper dominant landed castes, principally Kammas and Reddis of coastal Andhra. They in turn perpetuated a very exploitative and oppressive land regime which inhibited land reforms and the modernization of agriculture in the long run.

The Kammas and Reddis of coastal Andhra made effective use of the British legacy of the modern land tenure system, irrigation facilities and market networks to transform themselves into economically dominant castes in AP. They also succeeded in transforming their economic dominance into control of political power after AP was created. Given that the Kammas and Reddis combined consistently accounted for about 10 percent of undivided AP's population, their monopoly of economic and political power was largely perceived to perpetuate an exclusionary and discriminatory regime.[35] This popular perception was also largely made possible even as large segments of the educated middle class which emerged across castes (both "forward" and "backward") in AP could no longer be accommodated in the old patrimonial system following the expansion of modern education.

The fall out of a perceived exclusionary and discriminatory regime became increasingly apparent as India's economy liberalized and opened up to global trade and capital since the 1990s. The benefits of liberalization could be reaped more easily by states and regions with higher levels of literacy, education, health and infrastructure. They could embark on a "race to the top" in terms of mobilizing their disproportionally higher development index for economic gain while the rest remained economic laggards.[36] In the context of AP this divide played out most pertinently between the "backward" Telangana region and the economically and politically dominant coastal Andhra. The control of the film industry and infrastructure like airports, highways, flyovers, malls, and residential complexes by Andhra capitalists, reinforced the overwhelming sense of Telangana being relegated to an internal colony. Because comic characters in the Telugu films with their rustic and broken language were mostly drawn from Telangana region, it was conveniently used not only to reinforce their cultural backwardness but also their marginal role in Telugu society. Not surprisingly, the Telangana people argued that their language and culture are distinctive from their coastal Andhra counterparts especially given that the former's language and culture have indelible influence of Urdu language and Persian culture (dress, food, way of life, and so on) which were entrenched by the Nizam rulers during the 18th and 19th centuries unlike their counterparts in coastal Andhra and Rayalseema who came under the influence of British education and colonial modernity from the latter part of the 18th century. In all of the aforementioned, the formation of Telangana was seen as the panacea that would help the Telangana people overcome cultural, economic, linguistic and political domination.[37]

These experiences and the persistent *mulki rules* controversy added fuel to the fire of longstanding grievances and a sense of insecurity which the people of

Telangana region felt against their co-linguistic counterparts from coastal Andhra. Originally framed by the Nizam of Hyderabad in 1919 as *firmaans* (decree), the "mulki rules" give the mulkis (local residents), who fulfill the minimum domiciliary requirement of 15 years in Hyderabad, favorable access to subordinate civil services. The controversy surrounding mulki rules was confounded, inter alia, by (i) allegations of serious irregularities committed by the state in issuing bogus *mulki* certificates which allegedly secured jobs to many migrants from coastal Andhra and foreclosed employment opportunities to Telangana youths; (ii) two controversial decisions of the courts in 1968.[38] While the Andhra High Court ruled that these rules would not be applicable to jobs in autonomous boards and corporate bodies, the Supreme Court invalidated a provision of the Public Employment (Requirements as to Residence) Act, 1957 which sought to give preferences to local residents in public employment. Students in Osmania University protested against these decisions, which resulted in a separate Telangana movement that became particularly popular in urban areas after the Telangana Praja Samithi (TPS) was formed by Pratap Kishore and Congress factional leaders like M. Chenna Reddy in 1969. Armed with popular support for a separate Telangana, TPS swept the 1971 general elections in the Telangana region by winning 10 out of the 14 Lok Sabha seats.

However, leaders of the Telangana movement were soon co-opted into the Congress. Confronted with a non-committal national leadership under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and with most of their leaders arrested, the movement got dissipated by 1973–74. The Prime Minister's Six-Point Formula of 1973 was also at work behind this.[39]

After long years of being relegated to the background, the Telangana movement got a new lease of life in 2001 when Kalvakuntla Chandrasekhar Rao (KCR) formed the Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS) and began to spearhead it.[40] Unlike TPS which operated under a one dominant party system, TRS benefited from the new political opportunity structure linked to unstable coalition governments at the national level and used it to advance its separate Telangana agenda.[41] In the 2004 Lok Sabha parliamentary elections the TRS gained 5 seats despite winning just 0.6 percent of the national electoral votes. Its seat share declined to 2 in the national parliamentary elections in 2009 even though its electoral support increased tenfold (6.2 percent) compared with 2004. Higher vote shares for the TRS produced lower seat shares in the 2009 elections because Congress managed to widen the gap with TRS from 8 to 14 percent, increasing the number of Congress seats from Andhra in the Lok Sabha from 14 to 27 (see Appendix Table 1 in the appendix).[42]A swing of about 3 percent of the vote in AP State Assembly elections in 1999 and 2004 could fetch more than a hundred seats for either Congress or the TDP (see Appendix Table 2). The sensitivity of seat shares in the state and national legislatures to small adjustments in the vote and the political vacuum created by the death of YS Rajsekhara Reddy in 2009, the

influential Congress leader and two-time Chief Minister of AP, greatly enhanced TRS's "governing" and "blackmail" potential in the party system.[43]

To realize his political objective, KCR entered into an electoral alliance with the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance coalition at the Centre in 2004. Although UPA listed the formation of Telangana as one of the items of its election manifesto in 2004, it did not vigorously pursue the matter except prevailing upon the President of India to formally announce that the formation of Telangana would be considered in appropriate time. KCR deserted the UPA as a result and entered into an electoral alliance with the TDP and the Left in 2008. When he found these parties not very helpful, he subsequently switched alliance to the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) after the 2009 AP Assembly elections. Unfortunately, the NDA could not return to power in 2009, which meant that the KCR's electoral gamble did not pay off. Yet TRS, along with various social movements, succeeded in catapulting Telangana to the limelight of federal electoral calculations and exerted tremendous pressure on political parties to expedite the creation of Telangana.[44]

Eventually Telangana was formed on June 4, 2014 because of the fortuitous alignment of multiple interests and agenda of political parties and social movements under the changed context of coalition politics and liberalization of India's economy, a point argued by Louise Tillin in her case studies of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Uttarakhand.[45]

New Delhi's decision to create Telangana via Article 3 of India's Constitution caters to the longstanding popular demand of a separate state. Yet, it was clearly at odds with the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the AP State Legislative Assembly members from coastal Andhra and Rayalseema regions who, in a voice vote, opposed the creation of a separate Telangana state.[46] Such a unilateral move would have been unimaginable in conventional federal states like the United States wherein territorial borders of constituent units are considered inviolable unless the latter concur with the federal government to re-size or re-map their borders.[47]

The formation of Telangana stands out in many ways. First, it underscores the inadequacy of language as a basis to territorially hold people and state(s) together in the face of a weak accommodative structure. Such a structure can indeed be precarious when underpinned by longstanding grievances and perceived discrimination which the Telangana people hold against the politically dominant and territorially concentrated co-linguistic group of an economically prosperous region. Remarkably, the formation of Telangana broke the linguistic criterion on the basis of which most Indian states were redrawn since 1956 but fulfilled three of the four golden rules of state reorganization in India, viz.: non-secessionist, non-violent and popular.[48]

Second, it is the first time in the history of state reorganization in India in which unprecedented splits occurred across party and regional lines. The move to create Telangana was frontally opposed by none other than N. Kiran

Kumar Reddy, the prominent Congress-I leader and then AP Chief Minister (CM). In sharp contrast to Congress' leaders from Telangana, Reddy and the vast majority of Congress members from coastal Andhra and Rayalseema vehemently opposed the stand taken by the national-level Congress leadership. Similar splits took place in other political parties such as the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) although their central leadership also formally extended support to the formation of Telangana. The Communist Party of India-Marxist [CPI(M)] distinctively stood out for its consistent support for a united AP. It had opposed the formation of Telangana on the contention that "small states will weaken the federal principle."[49] For one thing, extensive splits *within* parties underscored the enduring role of factional politics in Andhra Pradesh, a politics which gained particular traction in the era of coalitions. Furthermore, as argued above, the rise of electoral volatility and the narrowing gap of electoral support for parties in the era of coalitions (see Table 2 in the appendix) opened up new opportunities for regional parties like the TRS and simultaneously "enhanced" their "governing" and "blackmail" potential.[50] Moreover, these splits also underscore the relative "stickiness" of territorial borders (as containers of social, economic, and political power) and the "fickle" nature of parties' stances on state formation. The latter are susceptible to change when the political context changes.[51]

Third, the formation of Telangana underscores the importance of emerging multilevel federal processes which go beyond the conventional understanding of a federation as a two-level interaction between the centre and the states. It is this multilevel process that made regions such as Telangana with distinctive political history, memory, and experiences matter in the federal calculus.

Case study 2

Bodoland in Assam: Sub-regional territorialization and micro-partition

Northeast India, consisting of seven states[52] (population 39 million in 2011), and home to a mosaic of ethnic groups, tribal and non-tribal, each claiming to be indigenous and distinct from the others, has witnessed and is still witnessing a plethora of political militancy revolving around the demand for territorial autonomy and statehood. While political extremism and violence has generally been contained, since the 1990s the Bodoland movement in Assam has attracted considerable scholarly and media attention, not so much because of its significance in national politics (the seven states of the region excluding Sikkim send only 25 members to Lok Sabha) but due to the persistent and mindless violence in the region caused by the Bodo militants on the non-Bodos and vice versa.[53] The formation of the Bodoland Autonomous Council (under state law) in 1993 and subsequently the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) in 2003 after

amending the Sixth Schedule was an attempt to grant territorial autonomy and cultural recognition to the Bodos, one of the "plain tribes" of Assam comprising 13.73 percent of the total population of Assam (2001), and 31 percent (2001) in the BTC area. However, the grant of territorial autonomy to the Bodos, has failed to bring about stability, peace and development in the region, which remains embroiled in interethnic clashes, verging often on ethnic cleansing.

The Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC) was formed under the Accord signed on February 20, 1993 between the State Government, the All Bodo Students' Union (ABSU) and the Bodo Peoples' Action Committee (BPAC) in the presence of Rajesh Pilot, the then Cabinet Minister for Internal Security. Following the Accord the Assam Legislature passed the Bodoland Autonomous Councils Act in 1993 itself. The primary objective was to accord recognition and autonomy to the Bodos through an administrative territorial arrangement designed to further the social, economic, educational and cultural advancement of the Bodos within a democratic framework. Unlike other cases of formation of District/Regional Councils in the Northeast, the case of the Bodo Council was a poor recipe for the ethnic heterogeneity of the region insofar as the Bodos constitute a demographic minority within their own region. Hence, when the BAC was formed, the boundary of the BAC was not delimited but certain common principles of boundary delimitation were accepted by the parties to the Accord. Since the Bodos were scattered across the eight districts of Kokrajhar, Dhubri, Bongaigaon, Barpeta, Nalbari, Kamrup, Darang and Sonitpur, the accord provided that areas with a Bodo population of 50 percent or more shall comprise the BAC, but some areas with less than 50 percent were also included to give the BAC territorial compactness and contiguity.[54]

The agreement, however, failed to satisfy the Bodos since the overarching domination of the state government on the Bodos was retained in the sense the power of the BAC was limited to make by-laws in limited subjects, but the Council had no substantial legislative or executive powers. The Accord never materialized as elections were not held to the BAC and the state government did not transfer any power to the Council. Thus, it failed to serve the purpose of shared rule.

In the years that followed, Assam, particularly the Bodo regions witnessed renewed violence with several militant Bodo organizations demanding a separate state of Bodoland. After several rounds of dialogues mostly tripartite between the Centre, the state and the Bodo leadership and intense militancy, it was decided that a new political structure would be provided in the form of a BTC which would be given autonomy under the Sixth Schedule of India's Constitution. It was a *sub-federal authority* with constitutionally guaranteed powers and authority but with less autonomy than the state government under the Indian federation.[55]

On February 10, 2003, the Assam Government, the Union Government led by the NDA (BJP led NDA) coalition and the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT)

(once banned by the Union Government as a terrorist outfit) signed the Memorandum of Settlement[56] to form the BTC. The banned outfit, which had launched its movement for a separate state of Bodoland entered into a ceasefire agreement with the Centre on March 29, 2000 and subsequently, the NDA-led Union government, the state government and the BLT finalized the conditions to end the insurgency, with the BLT promising to surrender arms and become a partner in peace making.[57]

In fact, more recently the BLT transformed into a political party, the Bodoland People's Front (BPF), formed the government and became a coalition partner with the state government and the UPA central governments after the general elections in 2004 and 2009. Legitimizing insurgent groups by making them partners in the peace process has been a common method by the union government for suppressing ethnic violence. In what Nani Gopal Mahanta calls "a top down, involvement of one group of the conflict, an imposing hegemonic attitude is discernible on the part of the Indian state."[58] While the Union government invited the BLT despite being an extremist organization and having engaged in mass scale violence and killings in the preceding years, the non-Bodo organizations were not made a party to the accord, thus putting them at risk in a desperate attempt to pacify the Bodo militants at the cost of the majority non-Bodos. This turned the table against them and in the process legalized the otherwise militant BLT.

Two factors seemed to give the Bodos vis-à-vis non-Bodos, the political opportunity to demand an autonomous body under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. First, the NDA's move in 2000 to create three small states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand provided much encouragement to the Bodos, exemplified for instance by the many interventions of S.K. Bwiswmuthiary, the sole Bodo MP in Parliament. In order to put the case of Bodoland in national perspective, the MP said in the Lok Sabha on July 22, 1998:

> Sir, I welcome the Government of India's move to grant statehood to the backward regions of Uttaranchal, Vananchal (Jharkhand) and Chhattisgarh, and will always do so in regard to the implementation of the "Small States Concept" in other deserving regions too. However, the most genuine, legitimate and long pending demand for a separate Bodoland State was kept aside while announcing the Cabinet decision in regard to creation of "Uttaranchal, Vananchal and Chhattisgarh" only. The present government of India should take a concrete policy decision on the long standing demand for a separate State of Bodoland too in order to bring about a lasting solution to the most alarming Bodoland tangle, by granting Statehood on the lines of Uttaranchal, Vananchal and Chhattisgarh for the greater national interest. (Lok Sabha Proceedings dated July 22, 1998)[59]

This was only one of several occasions in which the MP went on to defend Bodoland in the Lok Sabha.

Second, BPF, the democratic face of the Bodo movement, was a coalition partner with the Congress Party in Assam between 2001 and 2013[60] and the party won 12 Assembly seats out of 126 in 2011 (and 10 in 2006). This

underlined their democratic mass support in the region and helped to retain support for the Accord. Although the Accord was signed when the NDA was in power in Delhi (1998–2004) the BPF continued to receive support from 2004 onwards too from UPA 1 and 2, (2004–13) as it was a coalition partner with the Congress party in Assam.[61] When Telangana was conceded in 2013 by the Congress led UPA, the BPF renewed their movement for statehood pressurizing the UPA to concede Bodoland. When the Congress showed no interest in acceding to their demand, the BPF left the INC led coalition in 2013 to join the BJP-led NDA. In the recently held 2016 Assam Legislative Assembly elections, the BPF won 12 seats and was quick to establish ties with BJP, the ruling party and even managed a Cabinet berth. Promila Rani Brahma, a BPF leader, has been chosen as the Minister of Welfare of Plain Tribes and Backward Classes. It is thus apparent that the Bodo leaders did not mind the political color of the Central or state alliance so long as their political purpose was being served.

Despite this, the boundary issue remained unresolved and a bitter confrontation ensued even after the 2003 accord. There is considerable overlap among the Bodo and non-Bodo population (see Appendix Table 3 and Appendix Table 4) in the four districts (carved out of former eight districts where the Bodos were spread) and there are some villages with a higher non-Bodo than Bodo population. Clause 3.1 of the Accord provides that the 3082 villages and areas shall be divided into four contiguous districts on the lines of the proposal given by BLT subject to clearance of the Delimitation Commission. Furthermore, Clause 3.2 adds that a committee comprising one representative each from the Government of India and Assam and the BLT will decide by consensus on the inclusion of additional villages and areas in the BTC either or both on the criteria of tribal population being not less than 50 percent or territorial contiguity.[62] But during the process of right sizing of territories the upper hand was given to the BLT despite the fact that the Bodos were a minority in some of the villages. Put differently, a group of people comprising only 30 percent of their territory or even less was given autonomy to decide the future of non-Bodos, making up the remaining 70 percent or more; hardly a democratic decision. Hence, rather than providing self-rule to a localized majority, here a localized minority was empowered, against all prevailing practice in Indian federalism and the management of ethnic conflict. This autonomy arrangement has complicated the politics of ethnic cleavages in the region.

By contrast, the Bodo movement during the 1950s and 1960s had focused primarily on the recognition of the Bodo language and script and the prevention of the Assamization of their culture, a demand in which homeland or territory did not figure at all. But the statement by the late Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi in 1967 that Assam would be reorganized on the basis of a federal structure gave the much needed impetus to the Bodos to demand self-rule.[63] What she implied was autonomy for the ethnic groups within the state of Assam. Though this declaration was made when she met a delegation of the Mizo Union, the

announcement could not have been more opportune. It came at a time when the Congress was losing seats in the Assam Legislative Assembly: the Congress won 79 seats (out of 105) in 1962 Assembly elections which declined to 73 in the 1967 elections (when the total number of seats of Assam Legislative Assembly was increased to 126). Apparently, Mrs. Gandhi was trying to woo the ethnic groups in her favor. This gave the much needed impetus and the demand for the creation of an Autonomous Region and the formation of Udayachal by the Plains Tribal Council of Assam was the first move towards a land of their own. The Bodos felt neglected, exploited and discriminated against and strongly resented that neither the successive Assam government nor the Union Government had done anything to ameliorate their plight.[64]

It is during this period, that is from 1987 onwards, that the Bodo movement adopted a militant strategy secure a separate state of Bodoland and conferment of Sixth Schedule status to the Bodo-Kacharis of Karbi Anglong, a district in Assam. Several militant Bodo organizations were born: the Bodo People's Action Committee (BPAC) was formed in 1988 to mobilize the Bodos and resorted to extremist methods against the non-Bodos to oust them from the region. Out of their internal conflicts emerged BLT, another organization which took up arms to further the Bodo homeland demand. It can be argued that the transformation from democratic to violent tactics was a strategy of the militant Bodos to outbid the moderate Bodo Sahitya Sabha, thus far the moderate face of the Bodo movement for identity.

The grant of subregional autonomous institutions in the form of District/Regional Councils is not new or unique to Northeast India since the region has a number of such Tribal Councils in Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura. The case of Bodoland is different from other demands of self-rule primarily because of the fact that Bodos are not contiguously rooted and because they are not the majority community. The four districts in Assam's northeast on the northern side of the river Brahmaputra constitute the Bodo Autonomous Districts, namely, Kokrajhar, Chirang, Udalguri, and Baksa. According to the 2011 census reports, the percentage of Bodo population in Kokrajhar is 31.4, Chirang 37.1, Udalguri 32.1 and Baksa 34.8 respectively[65] (see Appendix Table 3). The remaining almost 70 percent are Muslims, Adivasis (Santhals and others), Koch Rajbongshis and people of other non-Bodo communities (see Appendix Table 4).[66]

Given the ethnic mix of the region, the demographic numbers do not give the Bodos any justified claim *vis-a-vis* the combined others to their hegemonic status in the BTAD region. But the Bodo leadership has termed it a "preferential right"[67] and persistently opposed the claim of the other tribal communities to be given ST status. Such over representation is starkly evident in the composition of the Council. As per Clause 4.2 of the Accord: out of 46 seats, 30 will be reserved for Scheduled Tribes (read the Bodos), five for non-tribal communities, five open for all communities and six to be nominated by the Governor of Assam from the

unrepresented communities for BTC areas of which at least two should be women.[68] The over-reservation for the minority Bodos grossly discriminates against the majority of 70 percent of the other communities and undermines principles of fairness and political justice. Again, "the six nominated members from the unrepresented communities can hardly make any difference and such members are picked up from people who are supposedly closer to the ruling elite of Dispur having very little acquaintance with the unrepresented communities."[69]

The BTC has been in operation for 12 years but it has failed to achieve the objectives of the Accord.[70] The functioning of the BTC is rooted in power sharing through democratic elections but it has turned into a power game and political opportunism between the Bodo and non-Bodo organizations. Ethnic self-rule in all cases in India is not ascriptive, the political power here is to be achieved by the general method of elections in a free multi-party competition. BPF, the main representative of Bodo's interests and ruling party, has been controlling BTC since the first elections held in 2005, and has also emerged as the largest party in the recently concluded elections in April 2015 but with a much depleted seat share.

The BTAD (April 2015) and Lok Sabha (May 2014) election results shows how the electoral dynamics of the region has changed over the years with the growth of interparty and intraparty competition and rivalry. While elections were held for 40 seats, the BPF won 20 in comparison to 33 it had won in 2010, the People's Coordination for Democratic Rights (PCDR) got 7 seats and the non Bodo organizations got 13 seats thus highlighting the emerging political unity of non-Bodo organizations and a potential threat to the Bodo leadership. Although the BPF still remains a potent force, the non Bodo organizations are gradually gaining strength thus bringing to the fore the declining power of the Bodos in their own homeland. Confronting the BPF is the PCDR, another organization formed by the All Bodo Student Union (ABSU), Bodoland Peoples Progressive Front (BPPF) which in collaboration with the pro-talk National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), contested the elections as Independent candidates. PCDR is the outcome of internal rivalry within the BPF leadership, and its highhandedness in the governing process.[71] Thus, the growth of multiple faultlines within the ethnic leadership as well as institutionalization of intra-ethnic as well as inter-ethnic party competition seems to be the natural fall out of the faulty peace building process.

The result of the 2014 Lok Sabha elections in the Kokrajhar constituency which happens to be a Bodo dominated area and the headquarter of the BTC was historic as it led to the defeat of its longest serving Bodo MP, S. K. Bwiswmuthiary, in the hands of an independent non-Bodo Naba Sarania, a former ULFA leader. 20 non-Bodo ethnic and linguistic groups under the banner of the Sanmilita Janagostiya Aikkya Mancha (SJA) came together to support Naba Sarania and the candidate won by a huge margin of 3,55,779 votes (51 percent votes) from the

Kokrajhar constituency.[72] This may be attributed to the fratricidal clashes over leadership issues within the BPF which is highly self-defeating to the cause of the Bodos. A stronger explanation for his defeat though is the strong alliance between the diverse non-Bodo communities and their desperation to make a united front to wrest control from the Bodos in pursuit of their legitimate share of land and resources.

The BTAD results is the offshoot of both inter-group as well as intra-group politics wherein each Bodo faction actually competed with a rival Bodo faction (BPF pitted against PUDR) as well as against non-Bodo organizations (BPF against SJA). The 2014 Lok Sabha and 2015 BTC election results show that increasing representation of non Bodos at the sub regional, state and parliamentary level point to their desperate bid to outbid the Bodo leadership. More so the Bengali Muslims, Koch Rajbongshis and Rabhas each have their own political interests to oust the Bodos. This unprincipled politics is an obvious fall out of the whole process of creating the BTC; right from entering into an opportunist coalition with the terrorist outfit BLT, to giving the BLT an upper hand in redrawing the territorial boundaries of the BTC to the complete exclusion of the other stakeholders of the region. It demonstrates the undemocratic tactic of the Union Government.

In Bodoland, the discriminatory, oppressive and violent Bodo rule has not provided any protection to the ethnic or linguistic minorities or provided them with any scope in the governance of the region. To be precise, the BTC has delivered misgovernance: dismal law and order, the failure to arrest persistent violence, very discriminatory delivery of services to the non-Bodos and so on. The region has seen displacement and death of hundreds of thousands of people. The most important factors are control over land and scarce resources which are so precious in this rural community.[73] The number of displaced persons belonging to the non-Bodos and the Bodos are shown in Appendix Table 6 in the appendix. The BTC authorities did not simply offer security to the vulnerable. The most recent figures are truly frightening. In Kokrajhar district, whose total population is 886,999 (Census 2011),[74] 222,802 people have taken shelter in 91 relief camps, the highest number of internal refugees. In Chirang, 33,846 people have been sent to 25 camps; in Sonitpur, 9,862 people have been accommodated in 10 camps; and in Udalguri 3,860 are housed in nine refugee camps.[75] These instances of violence are a result of indigenous-immigrant cleavages and the desperation of the Bodos to have the numbers in their favor.

Like the Telangana case, the Bodoland case underscores the inadequacy of language as a basis to hold people together in a state. More importantly, it reflects the implications of the process of granting territorial recognition in a complicated multiethnic demographic region and the limits and pitfalls of the territorial autonomy principle at work. In fact, the case study clearly reflects that grant of territorial recognition to nearly *any* identity marker is a very poor adaptation of Indian federalism which paves the way

for political opportunism and short-sighted policies which are self-defeating. The Sixth Schedule which defined autonomy elsewhere in the Northeast has served some useful purpose in that it ensured relative political order and stability when an ethnic group constituted a good majority in the area.

No such institutional arrangement could have avoided the question of some minorities for whom some special protection measures were to be devised. But since the majoritarian principle operates in all such cases, the democratic protection (non-territorial) of the minorities may not be any match to the overwhelming control over the autonomous council by the majority group. In the case of Bodoland, the Sixth Schedule was amended to accommodate a plain tribe, the Bodos, but then the principle of ethnic self-rule was applied to the minorities for whom seats were over-reserved (30 seats out of 46 for one-third of the population defying all principles of democracy and undermining social justice). Second, in most other cases India's method of what was called "micro-partition" with "micro-sovereignty"[76] has worked because a majority ethnic community has been rooted in a particular territory. Territorial retraction experienced by the parent state in the wake of this "micro-partition" has worked in Assam following the creation of Nagaland, Mizoram and Meghalaya and a number of autonomous district councils in Meghalaya and Tripura. This has helped in preventing the spill-over of ethnic conflicts into other states. However, the same model has accentuated ethnic tensions in the BTC areas.

Concluding remarks

This article sheds a critical light on recent processes of territorial rescaling in India by examining the formation of Telangana and BTC. In both cases, despite different contexts of history, memory, ethnic structures, an experience of volatile coalition politics which served as a political opportunity structure in which ethnic rebels and elites could mobilize more easily for a territory of their own provided the common ground in their formation. Thus despite the case of Telangana being a very old case, statehood could not be achieved during the heyday of the dominance of the Congress party at the Centre. The Bodoland demand also grew out of a very specific history, memory and experience in Assam, but here too ethnic elites used coalition governments at the state and Central level in order to seek political opportunities and shifted their focus from recognition of a cultural identity to political recognition. In both cases, the so-called Brass principles were adhered to mostly in Telangana: non-violent, non-secessionist, and popular; in Bodoland, the movement for self-rule was non-secessionist and popular but violent. In both cases, no specific principle but a combination of factors was followed in conceding statehood or sub-statehood. In both cases again, full statehood and constitutionally guaranteed autonomy (Bodoland) have

been considered by the ethnic elites to be the optimal solution. In Telangana, the majority and dominant Telegu speaking elites got their state; in Bodoland, an ethnic minority was elevated to a political majority in the BTC at the expense of a numerical majority in Bodoland and the rest of Assam.

Both of these cases also illustrate that ethnic conflicts have been sought to be resolved by territorializing them, which is a long-standing method of conflict-solving in India. Emotional appeals to some ethnic bonds (real or imagined) acted upon such resolution. In Bodoland, the questions of "economic viability" and "administrative convenience" have not been considered at all. Our field-based research in India's Northeast and elite interviews in the region[77] show that such demands for even smaller ethnic states are to be found in each federal unit of the region. Kukiland, Garoland, Tuipraland, and so on are examples wherein territorial claims are rooted in distinctive ethnic claims.[78] The political parties at the Centre, more so in the period of coalition governments, have often served as an encouraging factor. Ethnic elites find financial incentives in the creation of new states. Subir Bhaumik, who is skeptical of India's nation building strategy in the Northeast, has pointed out with greater detail the weakness of national integration in the region which is occasioned by heavy deployment of military forces, improper use of development funds, and perennial problems of insurgency and ethnic conflicts.[79] Local elites have been used to enjoy largely unconditional federal development funds which target the Special Category status of the Northeastern states, and therefore vehemently protest against the current Central government's policy of withdrawal of those benefits. Nearly 90 percent of 52 elites of the region that were interviewed between May-December 2015 are squarely of the opinion that due to the above change in Indian federalism there will be renewed discontent in the region.

Both cases studies as well as the general history provided above also echo earlier inadequacies of linguistic and non-linguistic territorial rescaling in that they often freeze localized minorities (or even majorities in the case of Bodoland). Even Telangana seems to have proved the inadequacy of linguistic federalism, given the majority Telugu speaking nature of all the component parts of erstwhile Andhra Pradesh. As we have shown, Telangana was not given its fair due under the *Gentlemen's Agreement*, and this lack of territorial shared rule in the state paved the way for the gradual mobilization on territorial grievances when the appropriate political opportunity structure arose at the central and state levels. The further "micro-partition" of the state on June 2, 2014 does not fully resolve the issue of minorities though. In Telangana, the quantities of Urdu speakers (12 percent in the state as a whole against 77 percent Telugu) are sizeable in most districts—ranging from 41 percent in Hyderabad (urban) to 15.82 percent in Warrangal (urban). The Urdu speakers are all Muslims and the Urdu language is also associated with the language of the erstwhile Nizam (rulers) of Hyderabad. Because of its historical significance and status, one of the first official decisions made by the Government

of Telangana was to grant Urdu the status of first state language and the second official language of the state. However, the ability to enforce minority linguistic rights for the 13 percent speakers of other languages is likely to be weak. Telangana is thus also a multi-lingual and multi-ethnic state, yet official language policy may not adequately reflect that diversity. There is a policy lesson here: in order to accommodate the non-territorial yet large linguistic minorities, non-territorial power-sharing at the state level and the levels below holds good promises for enduring political order and stability. This can in fact be considered as a supplementary federal mechanism for the rest of the country as well.

In the case of Bodoland in Assam the "micro-partition" that took place defied all logic; political (territorial) recognition was accorded to an ethnic community (the Bodos) who are a minority (26 percent) of the population in the areas notwithstanding the fact that other ethnic communities constitute more than 70 percent. In this case the ethnic minority status of the Bodos has been over compensated by assigning a political majority to the Bodes in the 46-member BTC through constitutional means. This is anomalous. Quite predictably, in conditions of acute material scarcity, this has led to large scale discrimination in the redistributive realm followed by persistent ethnic conflicts disturbing inter-community relations.

Institutional arrangements for accommodation of ethnic identity in India are thus rather too flexible. The majoritarian political principle which informs all such territorial institutional arrangements are anachronistic and far removed from the actual multicultural and multiethnic reality on the ground. The existing mechanisms only empower the dominant ethnic community to the exclusion and deprivation of the other ethnic groups. India's federal practices have served to accommodate some *ethnic differences*, but not others; especially those lacking territorial concentration.

Finally, as far as the effectiveness of federalism in nation building in India is concerned, while some but not all sources of diversity have been accorded recognition, the other crucial aspect of the Nehruvian concept of nation-ness seems to have dissipated in the cacophony of accommodating diversity. In the Northeast, the nation-building strategy has produced a narrow basis for sharing civic rather than ethnic bonds. While the recognition of ethnic diversity by micro-partitioning existing territories goes on almost *ad infinitum* creating almost continuous ethnic ghettoization, the task of maintaining territorial integrity and unity is left to the security forces. The region is only second to Jammu and Kashmir in the deployment of security forces. Subir Bhaumik identified among others a lesson for the Indian nation-state to follow: Give up ethnicity as a policy basis in Northeast India.[80] This however may be difficult, if not impossible, given the deep imbrication of ethnicity in the body politics of the region. In fine, the so-called nation building strategy through majoritarianism-inspired federalism clearly has not worked in the Northeast. It seems that Lijphart's[81] consociational policy mechanisms contain some positive

lessons here. The Bodoland imbroglio offers, in other words, some scope for the application of a consociational solution by envisioning a coalition government, proportional representation, and minority veto. This alone can guarantee the protection of the specific interests of Bodos as well as other tribal and non-tribal communities in the BTC areas. A majoritarian principle of governance here is a poor and dangerous recipe for maintaining inter-community harmony.

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Notes

1. For a helpful account on the pedigree of territorial autonomy in Northeast India see Kham Khan Suan Hausing, "Asymmetric Federalism and the Question of Democratic Justice in Northeast India," *India Review* 13, no. 2 (2014): 87–111.
2. "Nizam" is the title assumed by Muslim rulers of Asaf Jahi dynasty in Hyderabad state since the 18th century.
3. On this see K. Srinivasulu, "Discourses on Telangana and the Critique of Linguistic Nationality Principle," in *Interrogating Reorganization of States: Culture, Identity and Politics in India*, edited by Asha Sarangi and Sudha Pai (New Delhi, India: Routledge, 2010), 164–89.
4. For helpful discussion, see Uddipana Goswami, *Conflicts and Reconciliation: The Politics of Ethnicity in Assam* (New Delhi, India: Routledge, 2014).
5. Standard texts on the politics of state reorganization include, among others, Emma Mawdsley, "Redrawing the Body Politic: Federalism, Regionalism and the Creation of New States in India," *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 40, no. 3 (2002): 34–54; Joseph E. Schwartzberg, "Factors in the Linguistic Reorganization of Indian States," in *Region and Nation in India*, edited by Paul Wallace (New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 1985); Louise Tillin, *Remapping India: New States and their Political Origins* (New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 2013); Robert King, *Nehru and the Language Politics of India* (Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 1997); Sarangi and Pai, *Interrogating Reorganization of States*.

6. W. H. Riker, *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1964).
7. However, that the idea was mooted by both the British rulers and the Congress since 1903 has been pointed out by Schwartzberg, "Factors in the Linguistic Reorganization," 157–58.
8. Harihar Bhattacharyya, "Ethnic and Civic Nationhood in India: Concept, History, Innovation and Contemporary Challenges" in *Ethnicity and Socio-Political Change in Africa and Other Developing Countries*, edited by S.C. Saha (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 196–211.
9. King, *Nehru and the Language Politics of India*.
10. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, a member of the Congress Working Committee (with Gandhian persuasions) and Congress party President in 1948, insisted upon solving the problem of formation of linguistic provinces as "the first and foremost problem." The supporters of linguistic provinces even held a conference in New Delhi on December 8, 1946 before the inaugural meeting of the Assembly, and these included such important Congress leaders as the Deputy Speaker of the CA, and a member of the Drafting Committee. The records of the meeting of the Congress in early 1947 show clearly that within the party pressure for linguistic provinces was alive. A meeting on June 12, 1947 even considered the creation of Andhra, Karnataka, Maharashtra and other states. Sitaramayya as a member of the JVP (1948) committee of the Congress party who, along with Nehru and Azad-two other members—was persuaded to advise the CA on linguistic provinces to caution against formation of linguistic provinces in India while expressing sympathy for the cause. See Granville Austin, *The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1966), 241.
11. Government of India (GoI), *Report of States Reorganization Commission*, 1955, Vols. 1–4 (Henceforth SRC Report, New Delhi: Government of India).
12. This said, the official approach to recasting state boundaries in India was never oriented to any particular criterion explicitly, although it was the INC's nationalist pledge to the people since 1920 to reorganize India after independence on linguistic basis. The terms of reference of SRC were also not specifically geared to language, but to take into consideration "the historical background, the existing situation, and the bearing of all important and relevant factors therein." Report of the States Reorganization Commission Vol 1 (New Delhi: Government of India), p.20.
13. Schwartzberg, "Factors in the Linguistic Reorganization," 173–74.
14. Bombay, re-christened Mumbai, is the capital of Maharashtra.
15. See Gurharpal Singh, *Communalism in Punjab* (Delhi, India: Ajanta, 1994), and B.R. Nayar, *Minority Politics in the Punjab* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966).
16. See Hausing, "Asymmetric Federalism."
17. See GoI, *47th Report of the Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities* (2010), 95. Report accessed online on January 1, 2017 from www.nclm.nic.in.
18. See GoI, *47th Report*.
19. P.S. Datta, *Ethnic Peace Accords* (New Delhi, India: Vikas, 1995).
20. Tillin, *Remapping India*.
21. Tillin, *Remapping India*.
22. GoI, *50th Report of the Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities* (July 2012 to June 2013). www.nclm.nic.in (submitted to GoI on July 16, 2014; accessed online on January 1, 2017 from www.nclm.nic.in.)
23. GoI, 48th *Report on Linguistic Minorities* (2010), p. 211, paragraph 38.10. The 50th Report does not make any general observations and recommendations. Report accessed online on February 3, 2017 from www.delhi.gov.in.

24. *The Indian Express* (December 5, 1955) reported that out of the 174 members of Hyderabad Legislature, 147 expressed their opinion on SRC Report. Of these 147 members, 103 favored Vishalandhra, 29 favored Telangana and 25 were neutral. See K.V. Narayana Rao, *Telangana: Study in the Regional Committees in India* (Calcutta, India: The Minerva Associates, 1972), 79–80.
25. See *SRC Report 1955*, 107.
26. Rao, *Telangana*, 81–84.
27. Rao, *Telangana*, 81–84.
28. GoI, *Report of the Committee for Consultation on the Situations in Andhra Pradesh* (Delhi, India: December 2010) (Chair: Justice B.N. Srikrishna), 407.
29. Ibid, p.408.
30. "Regional Council" eventually became "Regional Committee" and its membership was considerably expanded from 20 to 100. See Rao, *Telangana*, 99.
31. Rao, *Telangana*, 83.
32. Myron Weiner, *Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethic Conflict in India* (Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp.217–54.
33. C.H. Hanumantha Rao, *Regional Disparities, Smaller States and Statehood for Telangana* (New Delhi, India: Academic Foundation, 2010), 96. Also, see, Gautam Pingle, *The Fall and Rise of Telangana* (Hyderabad, India: Orient BlackSwan, 2014), 131–32.
34. See Duncan B. Forrester, "Subregionalism in India: The Case of Telangana," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 43, no. 1 (Spring 1970): 5–21; Carolyn Elliott, "Decline of a Patrimonial Regime: The Telengana Rebellion in India, 1946–51," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 34, no. 1 (November 1974): 27–47; Ranabir Samaddar, "Rule, Governmental Rationality and Reorganisation of States," in *Interrogating Reorganisation of States*, edited by Asha Sarangi and Sudha Pai (New Delhi, India: Routledge, 2010), 48–65; and Hugh Gray, "The Demand for a Separate Telengana State in India," *Asian Survey* 11, no. 5 (May 1971): 463–71.
35. Interview with Ashok Tankasala, journalist, Hyderabad, January 29, 2016.
36. Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne I. Rudolph, "Iconization of Chandrababu: Sharing Sovereignty in India's Federal Market Economy," *Economic and Political Weekly* 36, no.18 (May 5, 2001): 1541–52. Also see Rao, *Regional Disparities*.
37. Interview with I. Thirumali, historian, Hyderabad, May 27, 2015.
38. For a perceptive analysis see Gray, "The Demand for a Separate Telengana." Also, see, Weiner, *Sons of the Soil*, 217–54.
39. This Formula was incorporated into India's Constitution via the Constitution of India (Thirty-second Amendment) Act, 1973 when Article 371D was inserted. For a perceptive analysis on this, see, Gray, "The Demand for a Separate Telangana."
40. The establishment of Telugu Desam Party on March 29, 1982 on the platform of Telugu pride and self-respect and its spectacular electoral success largely stymied Telangana movement in the 1980s and 90s.
41. On the increasing role of regional parties in coalition politics in India, see, Adam Ziegfeld, "Coalition and Party System Change: Explaining the Rise of Regional Political Parties in India," *Comparative Politics* 45, no. 1 (October 2012): 69–87.
42. Note that Tables 1–7 are provided in appendice.
43. Many thanks to Wilfried Swenden for drawing our attention to this. See Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party System: A Framework for Analysis*, Vol. 1 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 123–24.
44. Interview with Ashok Tankasala, journalist, Hyderabad (January 29, 2016).
45. Interview with Kodanda Ram, Chairman, Telangana Joint Action Committee, Hyderabad, December 29, 2015. See Tillin, *Remapping India*. See, also, Jhumpa Mukherjee, "Regional Movements in India: Evaluating Telangana and Uttarakhand"

in *Globalization and Governance in India: New Challenges to Society and Institutions*, edited by Harihar Bhattacharyya and Lion Konig (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2015), 110–25.

46. See "Telangana Bill Rejected in the Andhra Pradesh Assembly," *The Economic Times*, January 30, 2014. www.economictimes.indiatimes.com (accessed December 3, 2016).
47. Vide Article 4(3)(1) of the Constitution of United States of America. https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-110hdoc50/pdf/CDOC-110hdoc50.pdf (accessed February 2, 2017).
48. The fourth "golden rule" considered by Brass is that such a movement should be a cultural/linguistic movement. See Paul Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in North India* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 17–18.
49. Communist Party of India (Marxist), *Note Submitted to UPA Coordination Committee* (Chair: Pranab Mukherjee), May 5, 2005. Reproduced in *Peoples Democracy* 29, no. 20 (May 15, 2005). http://archives.peoplesdemocracy.in (accessed December 3, 2016).
50. Sartori, *Parties and Party System*.
51. Mawdsley, "Redrawing the Body Politic."
52. Sikkim was included in 2012.
53. Nani Gopal Mahanta, "Politics of Space and Violence in Bodoland," *Economic and Political Weekly* 48, no. 23 (2013): 49–58; Suryasikha Pathak, "Ethnic Violence in Bodoland," *Economic and Political Weekly* 47, no. 34 (2012): 19–23; Udayon Misra, "Bodoland: The Burden of History," *Economic and Political Weekly* 47, no. 37 (2012): 36–42; Smitana Saikia, "General Elections 2014: Ethnic Outbidding and the Politics of 'Homeland' in Assam's Bodoland," *Contemporary South Asia* 23, no. 2 (2015): 211–22; Chris Wilson, "Ongoing Rebel Violence in Autonomous Regions, Assam, North East India," *Pacific Affairs* 89, no. 2 (2016): 287–307.
54. "Memorandum of Settlement, Bodo Accord, 1993" in Datta, *Ethnic Peace Accords*, 41–48.
55. The State Governor has powers with respect to many matters such as the territorial size, inclusion of territories, boundaries of the territory, and others. Also, law and order in the District Council areas remain within the competence of the state government.
56. The objectives of the agreement was multifarious but primarily to create an autonomous self-governing body to be known as Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) within the State of Assam and to provide constitutional protection under the Sixth Schedule of India's Constitution. For further details see Datta, *Ethnic Peace Accords*.
57. Kalyan Choudhuri, "Turning to Peace," *Frontline* 20, no. 5 (March 1–14, 2003).
58. Mahanta, "Politics of Space," 53.
59. S.K. Bwiswmuthiary during the Lok Sabha Debates on July 22, 1998 (accessed online on February 4, 2017 from www.parliamentofindia.nic.in).
60. The BPF left the INC led coalition in 2013 to join the BJP-led NDA.
61. The then Chief Minister of Assam though was not as enthusiastic in signing the accord but he complied. "I requested Pilot not to sign the accord in haste… I made it clear that the Bodo dominated areas of Lower Assam were not contiguous. So if the non-Bodo areas to be included in the BAC area for the sake of contiguity, the consent of the non-Bodos would have to be obtained. Mr Pilot, however, refused to listen and told me the draft had the blessings of Prime Minister Narsimha Rao. Thus I had no choice but to agree." Cited in Mahanta, "Politics of Space," 53.
62. "Memorandum of Settlement on Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC)," www.satp.org (accessed February 2, 2017).
63. Snehamoy Chakladar, *Sub-Regional Movements in India* (Kolkata, India: K. P. Bagchi & Co, 2004), 44.

64. Monjib Mochahari, "State Hegemony, Identity Politics and Resistance in Bodoland," *Journal of Tribal Intellectual Collective* 2, Issue 2, no. 4 (October 2014): 81.
65. The Bodos are enumerated as ST in Kokrajhar, Chirag, Baksa, and Udalguri districts. Redistribution of Tribal Population in Bodo Areas: A Case Study of Kokrajhar District. http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/61488/12/12_chapter%205.pdf (accessed January 3, 2017).
66. The Santhals, though an ethnic tribe and considered elsewhere in India as ST, do not enjoy this status in Assam.
67. Interview with Mr Tridip Daimary (aged about 40) of the Bodo People's Front (BPF), Kokrajhar, July 22, 2015.
68. "Memorandum of Settlement on Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC)," www.satp.org (accessed February 2, 2017).
69. Mahanta, "Politics of Space," 54.
70. *Statistical Handbook Assam, 2013* (Guwahati: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 2013). Accessed online on February 3, 2017 from http://ecostatassam.nic.in/reports/SHB2013.pdf.
71. Nazimuddin Siddiqui, "Bodoland Territorial Area District Elections," *Economic and Political Weekly* 50, no.31 (August 1, 2015). http://www.epw.in/journal/2015/31/reports-states-web-exclusives/bodoland-territorial-area-district-elections-2015.html (accessed February 3, 2017).
72. "32 Killed in 36 Hours By Bodo Militants in Assam, Curfew Imposed," *The Indian Express*, May 20, 2014. Accessed online on February 3, 2017 from www.indianexpress.com
73. See Sanjib Baruah, "Separatist Militants and Contentious Politics in Assam, India," *Asian Survey* 49, no. 6 (2009): 951–74; Udayon Mishra, "Bodoland: the Burden of History", *Economic and Political* Weekly 47, no. 37 (2012): 36–42. Sripad Motiram and Nayantara Sarma, "The Tragedy of Identity: Reflections on Violent Social Conflict in Western Assam," *Economic and Political Weekly* 49, no.1 (2014): 45–53.
74. Census Report of India 2011 (New Delhi: Government of India).
75. Shushanta Talukdar, "Killing Fields, Assam," *Frontline* (January 23, 2015). http://www.frontline.in/the-nation/killing-fields/article6756707.ece (accessed February 3, 2017).
76. John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, eds., *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*: C*ase studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts* (London, UK: Routledge, 1993), 31.
77. Part of our research materials from the Northeast of India is used here.
78. A report revealed that tribal groups, supported by National Federation of New States (NFNS), are demanding statehood for Gorkhaland (West Bengal), Karbi Anglong (Assam), Kukiland (Manipur), Tuipraland (Tripura), Garoland (Meghalaya), and so on. It is also reported that one hundred thousand emails have been sent to the Prime Minister Mr, Narendra Modi in favor of a separate state of Vidarbha. See, "N-E Tribal Ready to Intensify Statehood Movement," *The Hindu* (July 10, 2016). http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/N-E-tribal-groups-ready-to-intensify-Statehood-movement/article14480791.ece (accessed February 3, 2017).
79. Subir Bhaumik, "Insurgencies in India's Northeast: Conflict, Cooption and Change" (Working Paper No.10, East-West Center, Washington, DC, July 2007).
80. See Subir Bhaumik, "North-East India: The Evolution of a Post-Colonial Region," in *Wages of Freedom: Fifty Years of the Indian Nation-State*, edited by Partha Chatterjee (New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 1999), 310–27; and Bhaumik, "Insurgencies in India's Northeast," 36.
81. Arend Lijphart, Democracy *in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977).

Appendix

Appendix Table 1. Andhra Pradesh Lok Sabha elections (1983–2009): Seats won/contested and vote share in percentage.

Year/Party	*1984*	*1989*	*1991*	*1996*	*1998*	*1999*	*2004*	*2009*
BJP	1/2	0/2	1/41	0/39	4/38	7/8	0/9	0/41
	2.2	2.0	9.6	5.7	18.3	9.9	8.4	3.8
Congress	6/42	39/42	25/42	22/42	22/42	5/42	29/34	33/42
	41.8	51.0	45.6	39.7	38.5	42.8	41.5	39.0
TDP	30/34	2/33	13/35	16/36	12/35	29/34	5/33	6/31
	44.8	34.5	32.3	32.6	32.0	39.9	33.1	24.9
Left	2/5	0/4	2/4	3/6	2/6	0/13	2/2	0/4
	3.7	4.4	4.3	5.3	5.5	2.7	2.4	2.9
TRS	–	–	–	–	–	–	*5/22*	*2/9*
							0.6	*6.2*
Other parties	3/216	1/183	1/487	1/1340	2/269	1/188	1/179	1/463
	7.7	8.1	8.2	16.7	5.7	4.7	13.9	23.2

Source: Computed from various data of Election Commission of India available online at www.eci.gov.in and data from K.C. Suri, "From Dominance to Disarray: The Telugu Desam Party in Andhra Pradesh" in Sudha Pai, ed., *Handbook of Politics in Indian States* (New Delhi: Oxford), p.172.

Appendix Table 2. Andhra Pradesh state assembly elections (1983–2009): Seats won/contested and vote share in percentage.

Year/Party	*1983*	*1985*	*1989*	*1994*	*1999*	*2004*	*2009*
BJP	3/80	8/10	5/12	3/280	12/24	2/27	2/271
	2.8	1.6	1.8	3.9	3.7	2.7	2.8
Congress	60/294	50/292	181/287	26/294	91/293	185/234	156/294
	33.6	37.5	47.1	33.9	40.6	38.5	38.6
TDP	198/289	202/250	74/242	216/251	180/269	47/267	92/225
	46.3	46.2	36.6	44.1	43.9	37.5	28.1
Left	9/76	22/27	13/34	34/37	2/93	15/26	5/32
	4.8	5.0	5.1	6.4	3.3	3.4	2.6
TRS	–	–	—	—	—	26/–	18/–
						6.8	16.22
Other parties	24/1077	12/1393	20/1133	15/2357	9/1425	19/–	39/–
	12.5	9.7	9.4	11.7	8.5	11.1	11.7

Source: Computed from various data of Election Commission of India available online at www.eci.gov.in and data from Suri, "From Dominance to Disarray," p.167.

Appendix Table 3. Scheduled tribe population in Bodo Territorial Area Districts (BTAD).

Districts	ST* Population	Percentage
Kokrajhar	278665	31.41
Baksha	331007	34.84
Chirang	178688	37.06
Udalguri	267372	32.15

Source: Census of India 2011. * ST here refers to the Bodos; the proportion of non-Bodo ST population is very small. The Santhals (sizeable in number in the Bodoland areas in Assam) are not recognized as ST in Assam although they are considered as ST elsewhere in India.

Appendix Table 4. Non-Bodo communities in BTAD areas.

Non-Bodo Communities	Percentage
Bengali (Muslims)	19
Adivasi (Santhals and Kuruk)	18
Koch Rajbongshis	16
Others (Bengali Hindus, Nepalis and Rabhas)	15
Total	68

Source: Omeo Kumar Das Institute of Social Change and Development, Guwahati.

Appendix Table 5. Seats won by political parties in the BTAD elections.

Political Parties	*Seats Contested in 2010*	*Seats Won in 2010*	*Seats Contested in 2015*	*Seats Won in 2015*	*Gain/loss Since 2010*
BPF	40	31	40	20	−11
INC	23	03	40	0	−3
AIUDF	–	–	08	04	+4
BJP	08	–	40	01	+1
IND	40	06	40	15	+9
CPI(M)	05	0	07	0	Nil
AGP	09	0	06	0	Nil

Source: Assam State Election Commission 2015. BPF = Bodoland People's Front; INC = Indian National Congress; AIUDF = All India United Democratic Front; IND = Independents; BJP = Bharatiya Janata Party; CPI-M = Communist Party of India (Marxist); AGP = Asom Gana Parishad

Appendix Table 6. Total camps and inmates of bodoland conflict (As on August 29, 2012).

District	*Camps*	*Inmates*	*Total Displaced (During height of conflict)*
Kokrajhar	Bodo- 32 Minority- 13 Others- 01 Total—46	Bodos- 19,732 Minorities-24, 453 Others- 105 Total- 44, 290	44, 290
Chirang	Bodo- 06 Minority- 17 Total- 23 (Total—92 camps on July 30, 2012)	Bodos- 4,486 Minorities-32, 232 Total- 36, 718	1,04,064 As on August 2, 2012.
Dhubri	132 (All minority camps)	1,46,091	1,75,829 (all minority) As on August 2, 2012
Bongaigaon	12 (All minority camps)	8,313	8, 313
Total (In 4 Districts)	Bodo- 38 Minority- 174 Others- 01 Total- 213	2,35,412 (As on August 29, 2012)	4,85,921 (till August 2, 2012)

Source: Data released by Office of the Deputy Commissioner, Kokrajhar on August 29, 2012.

Appendix Table 7. Linguistic minorities in states and the official languages (2014).

Andhra Pradesh	Telegu (83.55%)	Urdu (8.83%)	Hindi (3.23%)	Tamil (1.01%)			Telegu; Urdu*
Tamil Nadu	Tamil (89.42%)	Telegu (5.64)	Kannada (1.67%)	Urdu (1.51%)			Tamil
Odisha	Oriya (83.4%)	Hindi (2.83%)	Kul (2.49%)	Telegu (1.94%)	Urdu (1.60%)	Bengali (1.335)	Odiya
Tripura	Bengali (67.13%)	Tripura/ Kokborok (25.46%)	Hindi (1.68%)	Others (5.72%)##			Begali, Kokborok & English
Goa	Konkani (57.13%)	Marathi (22.57%)	Hindi (5.70%)	Kannada (5.54%)	Urdu (4.02%)		Konkani**
Gujarat	Guajarati (84.40%)	Bhil (4.75%)	Hindi (4.71%)	Sindhi (1.89%)	Marathi (1.51%)	Urdu (1.00%)	Gujrati
Karnataka	Kannada (65.92%)	Urdu (10.485)	Telegu (7%)	Marathi (3.58%)	Tamil (3.55%)		Kannada
Punjab	Punjabi (91.69%)	Hindi (7.60%)	Others (0.71%)				Punjabi***
Assam	Assamese (48.81%)	Bengali (27.55%)	Hindi (5.89%)	Bodo (4.86%)			Assamese
U P	Hindi (91.32%)	Urdu (7.99%)	Others (0.69%)				Hindi & Urdu*
Maharashtra	Marathi (68.79%)	Hindi (11.03%)	Urdu (7.12%)	Gujrati (2.39%)			Marathi
Jharkhand	Hindi (57.56%)	Santhali (10.66%)	Bengali (9.68%)	Urdu (8.63%)	Oron (3.20%)	Others (4.64%)	Hindi & Urdu*
West Bengal	(85.77%)	Hindi (7.27%)	Santhali (2.80%)	Urdu (2.06%)	Nepali (1.28%)	Odia (0.23%)	Bengali & Nepali#

Source: GoI, 50th Report of the Commissioner of Linguistic Minorities in India (2014), pp. 4–227

*Additional official language; ** in Devanagri script; ## Mogh, Manipuri, Bishnupriya Manipuri, Halam and Garo together. The last column is for official language (s). *** in *Gurumukh*i script.